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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a global problem that urgently requires global solutions. The 
concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is the product of 
several sources of emissions from all countries. Consequently, the climate —which 
affects everyone— depends on everyone’s behaviour. 
The global nature of the problem makes the fight against climate change a global 
public good: the costs of abatement are national, while the benefits are global and 
independent of where the emission reduction is obtained. In this context, countries 
have the incentive to neglect environmental policies aimed at reducing domestic 
emissions and to rely on the reduction achieved by other countries. This is known 
as the free-rider problem. 
Traditional solutions for public goods applied at national level cannot be effective 
when these goods are global. Governments have the legal authority to establish laws 
and institutions within their territories but there is no legal mechanism to coerce 
reluctant free-riding countries into international treaties or agreements that would 
guarantee the provision of global public goods. 
Although the ideal system would be a cooperative regime in which countries 
negotiate a binding agreement to ensure efficient provisions of the global public 
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good, the Westphalian nature of the current system of nations makes this 
cooperation unlikely, though not impossible.1 
Theory and observation show the difficulties to design and approve effective and 
stable international climate agreements. In the past, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol set 
internationally binding emission reduction targets to signatory countries. 
Nevertheless, the United States (US) did not ratify the agreement and some of the 
signatory countries did not comply with their commitments. More recently, in 
December 2015, the Paris Conference of the Parties revealed again the political 
difficulties to adopt and implement a solution at a global level. Once again, without 
a system of penalties on non-participants and non-fulfillers, stable coalitions are 
difficult and emissions reductions are expected to be small (Nordhaus, 2015). 
In short, on the one hand the global character of climate change would require a 
global binding agreement inherently difficult to be achieved. On the other hand the 
problem needs an urgent solution and cannot wait for such an agreement. 
Accounting for this contradiction, and considering the difficulties of collective 
action to face global “public bad”, Elinor Ostrom (2009) defended the idea of 
adopting “a polycentric approach for coping with climate change”. Citizens as well 
as local and national authorities should voluntarily change their behavior in order 
to contribute to reduce the problem, while waiting for such a global agreement. 
Ostrom’s idea reflects what is happening in practice. In 2016, about 60 jurisdictions 
—national and subnational— had a carbon pricing instrument covering about 13% 
of global GHG emissions (World Bank Group, ECOFYS, 2016). 
In a globalized world, however, these unilateral actions might cause two related 
problems: carbon leakage —i.e. an increase of emissions in countries with less 
stringent or no abatement policies— and a loss of competitiveness for the country 
                                                     
1 The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an example of a 
successful global agreement. However, in the fight against climate change the experience so far has 
been much more disappointing. The different characteristics of ozone-depleting substances and 
greenhouse substances mostly explain the different difficulties to act against the ozone layer problem 
and against global warming. In the first case, the problem was associated with particular industrial 
processes and substances for which there were cheap substitutes. In contrast, global warming is 
associated with production processes that generally characterize industrial societies, such as the use 
of fossil fuels, intensive agrarian and cattle sectors, or a massive generation of waste. 
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implementing the environmental policy (Lockwood and Whalley, 2010; Horn and 
Sapir, 2013). In this context, the key issue is the need of some measures to ‘level 
the carbon playing field’ (Houser et al., 2008; Krugman, 2009). One economically 
well-founded measure is the so-called border carbon-motivated adjustment (BCA). 
With this instrument, the region that already has a carbon pricing mechanism —the 
abating region— imposes a ‘border adjustment’ or tariff on certain products 
imported from countries that do not limit their global warming emissions —the non-
abating regions—.2 
The carbon leakage and competitiveness are issues of concern and the debate on 
the viability of a BCA is in the political agenda of regions like the US (American 
House of Representatives, 2009) and the European Union (EU) (Mattoo et al., 2009; 
Kuik and Hofkes, 2010). Also international trade institutions such as World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have already considered the relevance of this measure (UNEP 
and WTO, 2009; Hillman, 2013; Matto and Subramanian, 2013a). However, a BCA 
has not been implemented thus far, partly because it gives rise to some unsolved 
issues. One of them is its compatibility with the international legal framework, 
which has become a crucial point in the debate of BCA design. In short, the general 
WTO philosophy refers to the so-called non-discrimination principle. Using the 
WTO words “the products […] imported into the territory of any […] contracting 
                                                     
2 The application of a BCA in the form of tariff could also be applied not only when the policy of 
the abating region is a carbon tax but also in the case of the existence of an emissions trading system 
(Gros and Egenhofer, 2011). However, the volatility of allowances price makes it difficult to 
determine which would be the proper border carbon price or tax. In this case “the requirement for 
importers to surrender carbon allowances is more likely to be compatible with international law than 
an import tax” (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010: 1742). Anyway, also in this scenario there would be a 
problem similar to the one related to carbon border taxes analysed in this paper: what number of 
allowances should the importer buy? In principle —as in the case we analyse in the paper— we 
could use as a reference the effective emissions generated to produce the imported good or the 
avoided emissions (see later). In this respect, it is the same to pay 20 euros for any ton of CO2 in 
terms of taxes or in terms of buying allowances. An important difference, however, is that the carbon 
price to pay is not fixed in the second case but it depends of the moment in which the allowance is 
bought. In any case our conclusions when comparing relative economic impact and viability in the 
context of World Trade Organization rules of different designs of tax base could be applied for 
defining different amounts of required allowances. On the different problems of implementing a 
border adjustment with emissions trading systems, see Monjon and Quirion (2010). 
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party shall not be subject […] to internal taxes […] in excess of those applied […] 
to like domestic products”.3 
This issue is closely related with the subject of this paper: the technical problem of 
computing the tax base of the tariff, which entails to define how to calculate the 
emissions of different products imported from different countries and, thus, how to 
design a BCA. 
There are two general approaches to define the tax base of a BCA. The first option 
takes as a reference the non-abating regions —the origin or place of production of 
the imported good— and it is based on the total emissions embodied in the good 
produced in the foreign country (Matto et al., 2009, 2013b; Atkinson et al., 2011; 
Dissou and Eyland, 2011; Böhringer et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012; Elliott et al., 
2013; Schenker et al., 2013). In the second option, conversely, the reference is the 
abating region —the place of destination or consumption of the imported good— 
and it is based on the total emissions embodied in the good if it were produced in 
the importing country (Matto et al., 2009, 2013b; Böhringer et al., 2012; Elliott et 
al., 2013). 
The option of a BCA based on emissions embodied in imports has been considered 
by many authors and it would have a positive impact in environmental terms 
because it introduces different taxes discriminating according the carbon emissions 
of different exporters. In any case, we should emphasize that the role of BCA is not 
to discriminate imports according their emission; its role in environmental terms is 
to make national carbon pricing more feasible and improve it avoiding 
competiveness and leakage problems. 
Even more importantly, its implementation would be almost unfeasible because it 
is very data demanding, especially if we want to apply different taxes to different 
producers and not based on countries’ average emissions. It would require a large 
amount of data about technologies and sectorial emissions in different countries, 
                                                     
3 See articles I and III in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO 1947, 1994). However, 
there is an important debate and a legal discussion about the interpretation of these articles. In fact 
the non-discrimination principle might be overcame through article XX of the same WTO text that 
contemplates exceptions to the non-discrimination principle (see Hillman, 2013 for a detailed 
discussion). 
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which are not available for all countries and all economic activities. Moreover, it 
would be very difficult to control the deviation of exports from more polluting 
countries using third countries (see Monjon and Quirion, 2010).  
Even in the case of solving the practical problems of estimating embodied 
emissions, this measure could find a great opposition arguing that it infringes the 
two aforementioned WTO principles. Besides, even in the case of a BCA WTO-
compatible design, some developing countries could manifest their reticence for its 
potential as a protectionism measure (Holmes et al., 2011) and they could apply 
trade retaliations (Fouré et al., 2016). In this context, Sakai and Barret (2016) 
propose the ‘best available technology’ principle as an equalization measure that 
would avoid being challenged under WTO law. This proposal, however, is not 
exempted from implementation problems linked to the definition of the best 
technology of reference. 
On the other hand, a BCA based on emissions embodied in the domestically 
produced good might be considered as more clearly compatible with WTO 
principles and it would also be less data demanding. However, in this case the 
problem would be the definition of the domestic technology due to the complexity 
of global supply chains that characterizes production processes nowadays. 
In this paper we propose an innovative alternative to design a BCA based on the 
total —direct and indirect— emissions that the abating region would have 
generated if it had produced completely —i.e. in all the phases of production— all 
the imports from non-abating regions in its own territory. We called it a BCA based 
on avoided emissions and it reproduces a hypothetical autarky situation. We assume 
that all inputs —domestic and imported— have been produced in the abating region 
by applying the so-called ‘domestic technology assumption’ corrected for 
international price differences (Arto et al., 2014), i.e. we introduce the deflation of 
imports as an equalization measure.4 
                                                     
4 Our proposal is somehow in line with the approach of Mattoo et al. (2009), Böhringer et al. (2012) 
and Elliott et al. (2013) who propose as a possible metric to take into account the emissions generated 
producing the goods within the importing country. Anyway, the previous studies do not explicitly 
consider that the goods produced by the importing countries use some inputs that are imported. So 
it is not clear how they propose to take into account the emissions generated to produce those inputs, 
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The design of the BCA based on avoided emissions tries to guarantee that imported 
goods received a treatment similar to ‘like’ domestic products as the WTO 
framework suggests. Moreover this system has an additional advantage in terms of 
empirical application because it requires much less information than previous BCA 
systems; in particular, it only requires data about the technology and sectorial 
emissions from the abating country or region. 
Any option based on taxing imports taking into account domestic technologies 
treats equally imports from countries with different technologies. In particular, it 
does not recognize the merit of foreign producers who use cleaner technologies than 
domestic ones. However, the problem is not the existence of a border tax but the 
inexistence of a global carbon tax. In the absence of carbon taxes the environmental 
merits of cleaner technologies are not recognized because enterprises do not pay for 
climate change costs. In any case, it could be possible to introduce the possibility 
for exporters to claim that their total (direct and indirect) emissions for producing 
a specific product are lower than the emissions used to define the tax and to benefit 
from tax discounts. 
We take the EU as a case study; we assume that the EU applies a BCA on imports 
in the form of a tax to compensate a European CO2 tax and, at the same time, that 
the EU exempts its exports from the domestic carbon tax (Holzer, 2010). Moreover, 
unlike the existing literature, the taxes and the BCA are applied at a product level 
and not at a sector level. Data from the World Input Output Database (WIOD) and 
COMEXT database are used in this simulation. 
The analysis provides results at a product and country level. In this way it shows 
not only the incidence of different BCA designs through the average effect for each 
country, but also the spread or concentration of BCA designs among the different 
products imported from different countries. It would be also relevant to take into 
                                                     
that is the novelty of our proposal. Simply referring to the carbon content embodied in the 
domestically produced goods might refer to the domestic production, excluding the imported inputs, 
or to the emissions embodied in the imported inputs too, taking into account foreign technologies. 
Moreover, we take into account international prices differences. Considering all these issues we 
think that none of the previous solutions would guarantee the same final treatment to domestic and 
imported products. 
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account the reaction of economic agents to prices changes as well as other 
substitution effects after the introduction of a BCA. However, the aim of our 
analysis is to address the problem of the design of a BCA, and in particular the 
computation of its tax base, what is called the metric problem. In that sense, the 
analysis of total economic effects of the implementation of a BCA is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section2 provides the methodology. Section 3 
and 4 describe the data and results, respectively. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
Imagine an abating region that applies unilaterally a domestic carbon price. In this 
context, we further assume that this region exempts its exports from the domestic 
carbon price to avoid the competitive disadvantage of domestic firms in the world 
market, and that it also implements a carbon border tax (CBT) on imported products 
to avoid the competitive disadvantage of domestic firms in the domestic market. 
Likewise we also assume that non-abating regions do not implement any emissions 
reduction policy or, if they do, they also exempt their exports from it. 
We consider two alternatives for the design of such tariff: one based on the actual 
emissions produced by the non-abating regions —i.e. a CBT based on embodied 
emissions (EE-CBT)—; and another based on the emissions that the abating region 
would have produced in autarky —i.e. a CBT based on avoided emissions (AE-
CBT)—. The design of the AE-CBT tries to guarantee that imported goods received 
a treatment similar to ‘like’ domestic products as the WTO framework suggests. 
 
2.1. CBT on embodied emissions 
The EE-CBT is our benchmark and takes into account the fact that production 
processes are often global and emissions generated in each stage of production are 
produced in different places with different technologies and, in consequence, 
different emission intensities. 
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In this context, the tariffs 𝝉𝐄𝐄 applied to each imported product depends on the 
carbon price that the abating region applies to the carbon content of domestic 
products —i.e. the tax rate t— and the embodied emissions per monetary unit of 
imported product —i.e. the tax base ?̃?𝐄𝐄—, according to the following expression:
5 
    𝝉𝐄𝐄 = 𝑡 ?̃?𝐄𝐄     [1] 
To calculate emissions embodied in imported products (?̃?𝐄𝐄) we use a multi-
regional multi-sectoral framework. Let us consider a world consisting of c 
countries, each composed of n sectors, in which sectoral deliveries are represented 
by 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 that shows the amount of output from sector i in country r consumed as 
intermediate input by sector j in country s in value terms. Besides, each sector 
generates a certain amount of emissions 𝑣𝑗
𝑠. 
The input structure or technology of the world is represented by matrix A, where 
each element 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 𝑥𝑗
𝑠⁄  indicates the input from industry i in country r per unit 
of output of industry j in country s (being 𝑥𝑗
𝑠 the value of total output of sector j in 
country s). In the same way, emission intensities by sector are  𝑒𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑣𝑗
𝑠 𝑥𝑗
𝑠⁄ . 
If we multiply imports by these direct emissions coefficients of the corresponding 
producer country (as in Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; Kuik and Hofkes, 2009; Lin 
and Li, 2011; and Burniaux et al., 2013), the emissions embodied in imports would 
be underestimated because direct coefficients ignore the pollution generated by all 
intermediate inputs —the direct ones but also those used to produce these inputs—
. So, to calculate direct and indirect emissions embodied in imports we rely on total 
emission multiplier from the standard multiregional input-output framework.6 We 
apply the expression 𝐆 = ?̂?𝐋, in which matrix 𝐋 is the Leontief inverse (𝐋 =
(𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏), and 𝐞 is the vector of emission intensities by sector. Each element 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 
                                                     
5 Matrices are indicated by bold, upright capital letters; vectors by bold, upright lower case letters; 
scalars by italicized lower case letters. Vectors are columns by definition, so that row vectors are 
obtained by transposition, indicated by a prime. A circumflex indicate that we have transform the 
vector into a diagonal matrix with the elements of the vector on its main diagonal and all other 
entries equal to zero. The notation i is used to represent a column vector of 1’s of appropriate 
dimensions, and I is the identity matrix. 
6 See Miller and Blair (2009). 
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of matrix 𝐆 reveals total emissions that sector i of country r produces for an 
additional unit of sector j in country s. 
However, the CBT should be applied at a product level. Then, considering that there 
are m products and that each sector can produce different products, emissions 
embodied in imported products ?̃?𝐄𝐄 are equal to ?̃?𝐄𝐄 = 𝐢′𝐆𝐔. Where 𝐔 is a diagonal 
block matrix of dimension [(n x c) x (m x c)] that links sectors to products and its 
element 𝑢𝑖𝑘
𝑟𝑠 shows the share of product k of country s produced by sector i in 
country r. 
2.2. CBT on avoided emissions 
A similar procedure is necessary for estimating the tariff 𝝉𝐀𝐄 applied to each 
imported product based on the avoided emission method: 
    𝛕𝐀𝐄 = 𝐭𝐀?̂??̃?𝐀𝐄     [2] 
In this case, the tax base ?̃?𝐀𝐄 accounts for total emissions contained in a 
hypothetically identical product produced entirely in the abating region —i.e. as if 
the imported product had been produced fully at home accounting in that way for 
the emissions avoided by importing goods—. 
We consider, then, that the abating region operates in autarky. For this purpose, we 
apply the domestic technology assumption corrected for international price 
differences (see Arto et al., 2014). 
In this context, total —direct and indirect— emissions by sector are calculated by 
𝐆𝐀𝐄 = 𝐞𝐀?̂?𝐋𝐀𝐄, where 𝐞𝐀𝐄 is the vector of emissions intensities for the abating 
region and 𝐋𝐀𝐄 is the Leontief inverse derived from the matrix of total input 
coefficients of the region (𝐋𝐀𝐄 = (𝐈 − 𝐀𝐭)
−𝟏). Matrix 𝐀𝐭 represents the technology 
of the abating region in autarky; thus, if matrix 𝐀𝐭 comes from the aggregation of 
domestic and imported inputs expressed in monetary terms, price differences across 
countries should be taken into account by applying a monetary deflator. In this case, 
each imported product k used as intermediate input is deflated using the ratio 
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between foreign and domestic price 𝑝𝑘
𝑠 𝑝𝑘
𝑟⁄ , which are the elements of the deflator 
vector 𝐝𝐀𝐄.
7 
As in the EE-CBT system, emissions by product are calculated as ?̃?𝐀𝐄 = 𝐢′𝐆𝐀𝐄𝐔𝐀𝐄, 
where 𝐔𝐀𝐄 is a (n x m) matrix showing the share of any product k produced by any 
sector i of the abating region. 
Finally, to obtain tariffs (𝝉𝐀𝐄) in the AE-CBT system, we define the tax rate vector 
𝐭𝐀𝐄 as 𝐭𝐀𝐄 = 𝑡𝐝𝐀𝐄. In this expression, 𝑡 is the carbon price already applied to the 
carbon content of domestic products by the abating region, and 𝐝𝐀𝐄 is the deflator 
vector that allows for deflating the monetary value of the imported product. This 
second deflation is important to guarantee that imported goods received a treatment 
similar to ‘like’ domestic products as the WTO framework suggests. 
 
3. Data 
All estimations have been made using data for the year 2009 from WIOD (Genty, 
2012; WIOD, 2012, 2013; Timmer et al., 2015) and COMEXT (Eurostat, 2015). 
From the WIOD we use a multi-regional input-output table, international supply 
and use tables, and CO2 emissions data for the year 2009. First, we use the multi-
regional input-output table at current prices to compute the EE-CBT. This industry 
by industry table offers information for 41 countries (27 countries of the EU27, 13 
other major countries in the world, and all the remaining countries aggregated in a 
single “rest of the world” region) and 35 sectors. Second, we use the international 
supply and use tables to compute the AE-CBT. In this case, we aggregate the 27 
countries of the EU into one single region —the EU27— using the information 
from the remaining 14 countries to determine the imported intermediate inputs of 
each sector. We also use the international supply and use tables to compute 
matrices 𝐔 and 𝐔𝐑, which allow to bridge information from 59 CPA products and 
35 NACE sectors. Finally, we use data on CO2 emissions (in 1,000 tons) by sector 
from the air emissions accounts, which have the same sector breakdown (35 
                                                     
7 To properly deflate imported inputs, 𝐀𝐭 should be derived from supply and use tables. The use 
table should be previously deflated using the vector 𝐝𝐀𝐄. 
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a Published Work that 
appeared in final form in:  
Rocchi P., Serrano M., Roca J., Arto I. 2018. Border Carbon Adjustments Based on Avoided 
Emissions: Addressing the Challenge of Its Design. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS. 145. 126-136. 
DOI (10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.08.003). 
© 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
 
11 
 
sectors) and geographical coverage (41 countries) as the multi-regional input-
output table. 
COMEXT contains statistics on trade among EU countries, and between EU 
countries and non-EU countries. Data are expressed in monetary terms (euro) as 
well as in physical terms (kilograms), which allow us to calculate the deflators.8 In 
particular, from a total of 283 trading countries and 881 products available in 
COMEXT, we use information on the 13 non-EU countries and “rest of the world” 
considered in WIOD and on 217 manufactured products aggregated into 22 WIOD 
categories. 
We omit agricultural products, raw materials and services imported by the EU in 
our analysis. First, we exclude agricultural products and raw materials because for 
some products of these categories import is the only way to provide these products 
to the European market. Two clear examples are cocoa beans to produce chocolate 
and coltan to manufacture electronic devices. Moreover, the data disaggregation 
available does not permit to distinguish between products imported by the EU 
because they are not producible domestically from products imported but also 
producible inside the EU. Second, we exclude services because we consider a CBT 
system of customs duties applied exclusively to products physically imported.9 
As a result, the CBT rates are calculated for 308 products (22 categories multiplied 
by the 13 non-EU countries plus the “rest of the world” from WIOD). These tax 
rates are average tariffs, assuming a unique homogeneous good for each WIOD 
classification, which aggregates a wide variety of products. 
 
4. Results 
We take the EU as a case study due to its leading role on carbon pricing (Gros and 
Egenhofer, 2011) and because there is a current debate on strengthening its 
                                                     
8 Table A.1 from the Appendix provides the deflators calculated in this study. 
9 It would be relevant to extend the analysis including the agricultural products and raw materials 
that are producible and/or produced in the EU, but this would require data more disaggregated than 
the ones available in the used database. Including the analysis of agricultural products and raw 
material would probably affect the results of our analysis, mainly Brazil and US. 
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environmental policies —the European Emissions Trading System (European 
Parliament and Council, 2003) and the European Energy Tax Directive (European 
Council, 2003)— to reach the EU’s challenging targets of emission reduction, in 
particular in the new framework of the Paris agreement. 
We consider the EU as a single region and we assume that it has a domestic carbon 
tax of 20 euro/tonCO2 applied to all sectors. This tax level was in fact the tax rate 
proposed, but not approved, for non-emission trade sectors by the European 
Commission to reform the European Energy Tax Directive (European Commission, 
2011; Rocchi et al., 2014).10 As the literature suggests, we also assume that the EU 
exempt their exports from the domestic carbon taxation to avoid the competitive 
disadvantage of domestic firms in the world market (Holzer, 2010). Likewise we 
presume that non-EU countries are not implementing any emissions reductUS the 
carbon field’ we simulate a hypothetical CBT that the EU would apply on products 
imported from non-EU countries. Tariffs are computed based on an AE-CBT 
system and we compare the results with tariffs based on an EE-CBT system, our 
benchmark. 
Table 1 shows AE-CBT tariffs by product for each non-EU country. Emissions 
avoided by the EU when it imports a physical unit of a product are the same 
independently of the country from which the product is imported; however, tariffs 
in Table 1 —expressed as percentages of monetary values— vary among countries 
due to international differences in prices. As this table shows, the products mostly 
affected would be those goods whose production in the EU is very energy intensive 
such as ‘other non-metallic mineral products’ (26)11 —which comprise the 
production of cement, ceramics, glass, and lime—; ‘coke, refined petroleum 
products’ (23) —based on the transformation of crude petroleum and coal into 
                                                     
10 Although we set the carbon taxation at a specific value of 20 euro/tonCO2 —which would be more 
or less equivalent a 7-8 euro tax for a crude oil barrel— to interpret our results more easily, the 
analysis could be expressed in a general form for any tax level t. As tax rates are a linear 
transformation of the emission content of each product, rates in a general form can be obtained by 
multiplying the results obtained by t/20. Moreover, this tax rate would be considered moderate since 
several authors have recently proposed that the adequate level of a carbon tax should be higher than 
100 US$/tonCO2 —approximately 95euro/tonCO2— (see, for instance van den Bergh and Botzen, 
2014). 
11 The number in parentheses after a product name refers to the product’s number in Table 1. 
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usable products—; and ‘chemical products’ (24) —including petrochemicals, 
polymers, basic inorganics, specialties, and consumer chemicals—. From these 
three categories, ‘other non-metallic mineral products’ (26) would be the most 
affected, particularly products imported from Russia (with a tariff rate of 7.8%), 
China (7.6%) and Indonesia (6.1%). For ‘coke, refined petroleum products’, the 
rates would be substantially high for Mexico (16.8%) and Australia (10.2%). 
Finally, for ‘chemicals, chemical products’, the most affected country would be 
Indonesia (8.1%). The remaining 19 product categories would have a (non-
weighted) country average rate smaller than 2%. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Table 1. CBT rates on avoided emissions, by product and country, 2009 
WIOD 
code 
WIOD product AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN KOR MEX RUS TUR TWN US RoW 
15 Food products and beverages 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.6 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.7 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.0 
16 Tobacco products 0.8 2.3 0.4 0.5 3.8 3.0 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.2 
17 Textiles 0.7 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.5 1.6 0.5 1.3 1.2 2.0 1.4 1.5 0.8 2.0 
18 Wearing apparel 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.0 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.3 
19 Leather and leather products 1.8 0.9 0.9 2.6 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork  0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.9 2.6 2.3 0.3 1.5 0.3 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.5 1.2 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  10.2 2.8 3.2 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 16.8 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.9 2.0 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  1.0 3.5 1.3 2.5 8.1 2.4 0.4 2.2 2.3 3.3 2.6 1.6 0.8 1.5 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.0 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.4 3.6 4.4 7.6 6.1 4.7 0.7 1.6 3.3 7.8 4.9 4.2 1.3 6.4 
27 Basic metals 0.5 1.1 0.3 1.7 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.7 
28 Fabricated metal products 1.0 1.9 1.1 3.2 2.3 3.0 0.9 2.2 1.4 3.0 2.6 2.9 0.7 1.5 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.5 1.1 0.4 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.5 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.6 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 
31 Electrical machinery  0.2 1.3 0.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.4 0.7 2.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.1 
33 Medical and optical instruments 0.3 1.2 0.5 4.2 0.8 1.9 0.5 1.3 0.8 0.2 3.1 1.6 0.4 0.5 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.4 0.7 0.6 1.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 
35 Other transport equipment 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.1 2.2 1.5 0.6 0.2 1.6 3.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  0.2 8.7 0.4 1.6 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.1 
Unit: percentage. 
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: Turkey; TWN: 
Taiwan; US: United States; RoW: Rest of the World. 
Source: own elaboration.  
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Anyway, tariffs of the AE-CBT system are on average significantly lower than 
those of the EE-CBT. Figure 1 presents results at aggregate level, showing that 
products affected by tariffs higher than 2% in a AE-CBT system (Figure 1a) would 
be less than half of those in a EE-CBT system (Figure 1b); conversely, products 
affected by tariffs less than 1% would be three time higher.12 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of products based on the tariff size 
  
a. Avoided emissions                        b. Embodied emissions 
 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
These differences are due basically to three countries: China, India, and Russia (see 
Figure A.1 from Appendix). For these countries only 27% of products would be 
greatly affected considering an AE-CBT and the (non-weighted) product average 
tariffs would be 1.9% (China), 1.7% (India), and 1.6% (Russia). Considering an 
EE-CBT, 100% of their products would be charged at tariffs higher than 2%, and 
the (non-weighted) tariff average would be, respectively, 3.9%, 4.9%, and 4.9%. 
Although in a less decisive way, for almost all the other countries, an AE-CBT 
system would also have a weaker impact than an EE-CBT in terms of both the level 
of the tax rates and their spread across products. 
These results suggest that the technology of the EU is in most cases less polluting 
than the technology of the countries from which the EU imports goods, i.e. the 
emissions would be smaller if the EU had produced domestically all its imports and 
in the same quantities. The only products that would be taxed more with the AE-
CBT system, and therefore more ‘polluting’, would be ‘tobacco products’ (16) 
imported from Brazil, Indonesia, and Japan; ‘textiles’ (17) from Brazil, Indonesia, 
and Turkey; ‘leather products’ (19) from Austria, Canada, and Turkey; and 
                                                     
12 We also made a similar comparison of the results obtained for a system based on avoided 
emissions, considering data in monetary terms without taking into account international differences 
in prices —i.e. without deflating—; the comparison shows the bias that would result from not 
considering international price differences. Taxes applied to monetary unity of imported product 
would be in general significantly lower than the ones obtained here. 
52%
32%
16% 17%
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‘chemical products’ (24) imported from Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey. All these 
products represent 15% of all products analysed (42 out 308)13 (see Table A.2 from 
Appendix). 
However, the effect of a CBT system would depend not only on the tax rate but also 
on the volume trade.14 Figure 2 shows the 20 products most affected by an AE-
CBT, which represent more than 60% of the total effect of the policy.15 Taking into 
account total value of imported manufactured products, the most affected country 
would be China —which accounts for roughly 30% of total tariff payments— 
followed by the US. In the case of China, the ranking of these products seems to be 
more closely related to the volume of trade than to the severity of the tax rates 
imposed. The three most affected products, for example, would not be energy-
intensive products, but ‘textiles’ (17), ‘radio, television, and communications 
equipment’ (32), and ‘medical and optical instruments’ (33). Two of the 20 most 
affected products would be from the US. In particular, US ‘chemical products’ (24) 
would be the fourth most affected product and US ‘other transport equipment’ (35) 
the ninth. Also, in this case it is due more to the volume of trade than to high tariffs 
(0.8% in both cases). Conversely, very high tax rates more than the trade volume 
explain the cost the reform would imply for Chinese products classified as ‘other 
non-metallic mineral products’ (26). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                     
13 In consequence, in our case study it does not seem very relevant the possible “excessive” taxation 
of relative cleaner products. In any case —as we have said in the introduction— it would be possible 
to treat these cases introducing some tax discounts. 
14 We made a static quantification of the policy effect taking into account the actual size of trade 
flows —i.e. considering that the trade flows were not altered by the policy—. The assumption is not 
realistic even though in the case of avoided emissions approach the simultaneous introduction of a 
domestic tax and a tariff on imports does not alter, in principle, relative prices between domestic 
and foreign products. 
15 The region that would actually be more affected by a CBT system is the region “Rest of the 
World”, which would pay roughly 40% of total tariff payments. However, we do not analyse this 
region in detail because it aggregates several and different countries, and it would not be possible to 
provide a more detailed explanation for the results found. 
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Figure 2. The 20 products most affected by CBT on avoided emissions, 2009 
 
Units: Trade volume in billions of euro; tax rates in percentage. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Because the impact on a CBT system relies more on the volume of trade than on 
the severity of the tariffs imposed, the ranking of the most affected products would 
change only partially in an EE-CBT system (see Figure A.2 from Appendix). 
However, the two systems would imply a strongly different impact for some 
products: ‘basic metals’ (27) produced in Russia —which goes from bearing 1.1% 
of total policy impact under the avoided emissions system to 4.4% under a system 
of embodied emissions— and Chinese ‘medical and optical instruments’ (33) —
that goes from 1.6% to 4.6%—. 
In this scenario, the overall tax collection of this environmental policy based on a 
AE-CBT system would amount to 13 billion euros, of which nearly 70% would 
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correspond basically to imports from developing countries —the Rest of the World 
(RoW) (38%), China (29%), and Turkey (5%)— only the US (9%) would the only 
developed country that would contribute more than 5% to the total amount (first 
column of Table 2). However, as the second column of Table 2 shows, these costs 
would represent a limited share —less than 2% in all countries— if we consider the 
total value of manufactured products that each non-EU country exports to the EU. 
In this case, percentages for the RoW, China and the US would be, respectively, 
1.3%, 1.7% and 0.8%. In any country, the cost of the AE-CBT imposed by the EU 
would not imply more than 0.11% of its gross domestic product (third column of 
Table 2)16. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2. Cost of the CBT applied by the EU for each non-EU country 
considering avoided emissions, 2009 
Non-EU 
Country 
Country’s share 
of AE-CBT’s 
total collection 
Percentage of the 
value of 
manufactures 
exported by any 
non-EU to the EU 
Percentage of 
the gross 
domestic 
product of 
each country 
Australia 0.5 [14] 1.1 [8] 0.01 [14] 
Brazil 2.4 [9] 1.7 [4] 0.02 [9] 
Canada 0.9 [12] 0.9 [10] 0.01 [10] 
China 29.1 [2] 1.7 [3] 0.08 [2] 
Indonesia 1.5 [11] 1.9 [1] 0.04 [7] 
India 3.9 [5] 1.4 [5] 0.04 [5] 
Japan 2.6 [7] 0.6 [14] 0.01 [13] 
Korea 2.4 [8] 0.7 [13] 0.04 [6] 
Mexico 0.5 [13] 0.8 [11] 0.01 [11] 
Russia 2.9 [6] 1.8 [2] 0.03 [8] 
Turkey 4.9 [4] 1.4 [6] 0.11 [1] 
Taiwan 1.6 [10] 1.1 [9] 0.06 [4] 
United States 8.8 [3] 0.8 [12] 0.01 [12] 
Rest of World 38 [1] 1.3 [7] 0.07 [3] 
Unit: percentage. 
Note: Countries ranking: [1] is the most affected country, [14] is the less affected. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
                                                     
16 For results based on EE-CBT see Table A.3 from Appendix. 
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5. Conclusion 
Carbon pricing is an essential piece in the fight against climate change. Although a 
significant progress has been made over the last decade, the effort is still 
insufficient. Most emissions are still unpriced and applied prices in different 
countries and sectors vary widely. In this context, a BCA could be a measure to 
offset the competitiveness pressure of imports from countries with a smaller or non-
existent carbon price. 
There are still no conclusive answers for a proper BCA design. The BCA design 
should consider not only its technical feasibility and data availability, but also the 
compatibility with the WTO legal framework and the risk of retaliation from 
developing countries. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on BCA design by proposing a BCA 
based on avoided emissions in which we take into account international price 
differences. Unlike previous analyses, we apply the BCA based on avoided 
emission at a product and not at a sector level. Moreover, our proposal includes that 
all exports should be exempted from their respective national carbon price. In that 
way, the avoided emission system would guarantee that imported goods receive the 
same treatment as domestic products in line with the WTO philosophy. The avoided 
emission system would also be more feasible since it only requires national 
information about technology and emissions. 
In this paper we simulate two possible CBTs applied by the EU: one based on 
embodied emissions (EE-CBT) —the most commonly analysed in the literature— 
and the other on avoided emissions (AE-CBT). The comparison of results shows 
that an AE-CBT would imply a smaller impact for most of the countries analysed, 
particularly for developing countries such as China and India. In that sense, a 
system based on avoided emissions may minimize the possible retaliation actions. 
Additionally, complementary mechanisms can be applied to make it clearer that 
border adjustments are not measures of protectionism and they are not aimed at 
raising public revenues. Mattoo and Subramanian (2013a) proposed to implement 
the BCA on the border of the exporter country and van den Bergh (2016) to return 
the BCA revenue to the affected country. 
In terms of analysis by product, two groups of goods would be most affected: 
energy-intensive products —due to their carbon content — and electronic products 
—due to the large money value traded with the EU—. These results might suggest 
 20 
 
limiting the BCA system only to certain products for instance to those most exposed 
to the risk of leakage. 
One of the essential elements of the Paris Agreement is that all parties are required 
to make their best effort through the so-called ‘national determined contributions’. 
In other words, countries will decide individually not only their emissions goals but 
also their mitigation policies. Thus, this agreement does not include any global 
carbon pricing. However, the fact is that carbon pricing is progressing in many 
countries. In a world where products are constantly traveling from one country to 
another, the international coordination of carbon pricing and also the problem of 
competitiveness will be more complex. In this scenario, the BCA based on avoided 
emissions would guarantee that every imported good would receive a treatment 
similar to the ‘like’ than domestic one, regardless the number of frontiers the 
product will cross. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A.1. Percentage of products based on the rate by country, 2009 
 
 
Note: the averages in parenthesis are computed as simple averages without taking into account trade 
volumes. 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Figure A.2. 20 products most affected by CBT on embodied emissions, 2009 
 
Units: Trade volume in billions of euro; tax rates in percentage. 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Table A.1. Deflators used to take into account international price differences to estimate the EU avoided emissions, 2009 
Product AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN KOR MX RUS TUR TWN US RoW 
15 Food products and beverages 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.3 
16 Tobacco products* 1.0 3.0 0.6 0.7 4.9 3.8 1.8 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.9 
17 Textiles 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.0 3.7 2.4 0.7 1.8 1.7 2.9 2.1 2.2 1.2 2.9 
18 Wearing apparel 1.0 1.6 0.6 2.2 1.5 2.1 0.3 2.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 2.5 1.0 1.9 
19 Leather and leather products 3.5 1.8 1.9 5.3 2.1 2.2 0.5 1.3 1.6 2.9 2.4 2.8 2.1 2.1 
20 
Wood and products of wood and 
cork  
1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.3 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 0.8 0.7 0.6 2.7 3.7 3.2 0.4 2.0 0.5 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.8 1.6 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  5.3 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 8.7 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.0 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  0.9 3.2 1.2 2.3 7.4 2.2 0.4 2.0 2.1 3.0 2.4 1.5 0.8 1.4 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.9 1.5 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 1.4 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 1.3 1.5 2.7 2.1 1.6 0.3 0.5 1.1 2.7 1.7 1.5 0.4 2.2 
27 Basic metals 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.4 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.6 
28 Fabricated metal products 0.8 1.6 0.9 2.6 1.9 2.5 0.8 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 0.5 1.2 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.9 1.9 0.7 2.9 2.3 2.4 0.9 1.9 1.1 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.8 1.0 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.4 3.1 2.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.9 
31 Electrical machinery  0.4 2.4 0.4 2.2 2.0 2.4 0.6 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.2 0.9 0.4 1.1 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 1.4 2.7 0.7 2.9 1.5 4.5 1.5 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.3 2.2 
33 Medical and optical instruments 0.6 2.5 1.0 8.4 1.6 3.7 1.0 2.6 1.6 0.4 6.2 3.1 0.8 1.0 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.7 1.2 1.0 2.7 1.4 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.3 
35 Other transport equipment 1.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 3.6 2.5 1.1 0.3 2.6 5.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 0.7 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  0.2 13.4 0.6 2.5 2.4 1.4 0.6 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.7 
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: 
Turkey; TWN: Taiwan; US: United States; RoW: Rest of the World. 
*: The category “tobacco products” has been adjusted using additional more disaggregated data from the COMEXT database “EU Trade Since 1988 By SITC”, following the 
nomenclature correspondence provided by Eurostat in the database RAMON available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_REL.  
Source: own elaboration from WIOD (2013), Eurostat (2015) and Timmer et al. (2015). 
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Table A.2. CBT rates on embodied emissions, by product and country, 2009 
    AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN KOR MEX RUS TUR TWN US RoW 
15 Food products and beverages 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.1 
16 Tobacco products 1.0 2.1 2.0 1.5 4.1 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.1 7.4 4.1 4.1 
17 Textiles 1.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 
18 Wearing apparel 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.4 
19 Leather and leather products 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 3.2 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.2 1.7 1.6 5.2 2.3 
20 
Wood and products of wood and 
cork  
1.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 2.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.1 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.7 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 1.1 1.1 1.0 3.4 2.2 1.2 2.9 3.3 3.1 3.1 5.4 9.5 4.5 12.8 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  2.0 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 10.3 10.3 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.4 4.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
25 Rubber and plastic products 2.1 2.9 3.9 3.9 5.1 5.5 4.2 0.9 2.2 1.3 1.3 2.5 1.4 1.9 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 10.1 6.4 6.2 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 7.4 2.7 2.5 1.5 0.9 2.3 1.2 
27 Basic metals 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.9 0.9 3.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.7 
28 Fabricated metal products 3.8 1.8 1.6 2.8 2.8 1.6 2.2 2.7 1.6 1.5 2.6 2.6 3.4 3.8 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2.1 12.3 6.7 6.7 1.5 0.0 1.8 2.3 12.3 4.2 4.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 
30 Office machinery and computers 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 2.1 3.7 3.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.4 
31 Electrical machinery  3.8 3.8 2.3 5.1 5.3 5.3 4.9 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.1 2.3 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 5.1 4.5 12.9 8.3 7.8 4.5 3.8 1.9 1.4 4.9 1.9 1.9 1.0 0.7 
33 Medical and optical instruments 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.5 2.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.3 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
35 Other transport equipment 1.7 1.6 1.1 3.7 1.9 1.9 0.9 3.5 3.4 8.0 7.1 2.8 2.8 1.9 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.5 1.5 4.2 
Unit: percentage. 
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: Turkey; TWN: 
Taiwan; US: United States; RoW: Rest of the World. 
Source: own elaboration.  
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Table A.3. Cost of the CBT applied by the EU for each non-EU country 
considering embodied emissions, 2009 
Non-EU 
Country 
Country’s share 
of EE-CBT’s 
total collection 
Percentage of the 
value of 
manufactures 
exported by any 
non-EU to the EU 
Percentage of 
the gross 
domestic 
product of 
each country 
Australia 0.3 [14] 1.6 [9] 0.01 [14] 
Brazil 0.6 [12] 0.8 [14] 0.01 [13] 
Canada 0.7 [11] 1.5 [11] 0.01 [9] 
China 29.6 [2] 3.6 [3] 0.16 [1] 
Indonesia 0.8 [10] 2.1 [6] 0.04 [8] 
India 5.3 [5] 4 [2] 0.11 [7] 
Japan 2.4 [8] 1.1 [13] 0.01 [12] 
Korea 3.5 [6] 2 [7] 0.12 [5] 
Mexico 0.4 [13] 1.5 [10] 0.01 [11] 
Russia 5.7 [4] 7.2 [1] 0.13 [3] 
Turkey 3 [7] 1.7 [8] 0.14 [12] 
Taiwan 1.6 [9] 2.3 [5] 0.12 [6] 
United States 7.5 [3] 1.3 [12] 0.01 [10] 
Rest of World 38.5 [1] 2.6 [4] 0.13 [4] 
Unit: percentage. 
Note: Countries ranking: [1] is the most affected country, [14] is the less affected. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
